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 Pursuant to this Court’s Order entered August 5, 2016, Respondent Holly Refining 
& Marketing Company—Woods Cross LLC n/k/a HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining 
LLC (“Holly”) respectfully submits this Supplemental Brief to address the standard of 
review applicable in this case in light of this Court’s recent decision in Ellis-Hall 
Consultants v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 2016 UT 34, __ P.3d __. 
DISCUSSION 
 Prior to Ellis-Hall, when this matter was briefed before the Utah Court of Appeals, 
there was a lack of clarity in this Court’s precedent regarding what standard of review 
applies to questions of statutory interpretation when the Legislature has granted an 
administrative agency discretion to interpret its own governing statutes and regulations.  
As recently as 2012, this Court held that because the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining had 
been given “explicit authority and wide latitude in interpreting the operative provisions of 
the Mining Act,” the Board’s “legal conclusions and interpretations of the Mining Act” 
can be set aside “only if those conclusions are ‘based upon a clearly erroneous 
interpretation or application of the law.’”  Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil, 
Gas, & Mining (“Sierra Club v. BOGM”), 2012 UT 73, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d 291.1 
                                                 
1 See also LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶¶ 8-9, 215 P.3d 135 (“The legislature may 
grant an agency discretion, either explicitly or implicitly, to interpret specific statutory 
terms.”); Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 18, 38 
P.3d 291 (in reviewing an agency’s “‘interpretation of the operative provisions of the 
statutory law it is empowered to administer, [agency] findings must be rationally based 
and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the 
tolerable limits of reason’” (quoting Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 754 P.2d 41, 50 
(Utah 1988))); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991) (it is 
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 In 2013, this Court decided Murray v. Utah Labor Commission, 2013 UT 38, 308 
P.3d 461, which applied a correctness standard of review to questions of an agency’s 
statutory interpretation and held that the mere delegation of authority to administer 
statutes and regulations does not require deference to an agency’s interpretation of those 
statutes and regulations under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.  Id. ¶ 28.  
Although Murray implied that this conclusion might reach further to cases involving an 
explicit delegation of discretion (because questions of statutory interpretation involve no 
“discretion,” id. ¶¶ 30-33), Murray did not expressly overrule cases such as Sierra Club 
v. BOGM, where there was such an explicit delegation. 
 Though not exactly the same as the statute in Sierra Club v. BOGM, the statute at 
issue in this appeal, Utah Code § 19-1-301.5, does contain an explicit delegation of 
discretion to the agency.  It states that “[d]uring judicial review of a dispositive action, 
the appellate court shall: (i) review all agency determinations in accordance with 
Subsection 63G-4-403(4), recognizing that the agency has been granted substantial 
discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules….”  Id. § 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(i) 
(2016).2  In its brief submitted below, Holly relied on this statute and the cases granting 
deference where there is an explicit delegation of discretion in arguing that questions of 
                                                 
“appropriate to grant the agency deference [on statutory interpretation] on the basis of an 
explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained in the governing statute”). 
2 This citation is to the current version of the statute.  The statute was amended in 2015, 
but the amendment did not change this provision.  2015 Utah Laws Ch. 378 (S.B. 282).  
The prior citation was Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(14)(c)(i) (2014). 
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law regarding the Division of Air Quality’s (“Division”) governing statutes and 
regulations should be reviewed deferentially.  (Holly Resp. Br. pp. 12-13.) 
 In Ellis-Hall, this Court brought more clarity to this area of the law and expressly 
“repudiate[d] our prior decisions calling for deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own orders or regulatory enactments.”  Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 28.  This conclusion 
was based on the holding that Murray had overruled these prior cases and required “non-
deferential ‘correctness’ review of agency conclusions of law.”  Id. ¶ 24.  Although Ellis-
Hall, like Murray, did not involve an explicit delegation of discretion, this Court again 
implied that such a delegation may be ineffective because “‘[s]tatutory interpretation 
does not present such a discretionary decision,’ and thus is not subject to deferential 
review.”  Id. ¶ 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes Gen. Contractors v. Utah 
Labor Comm’n, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 n.4, 322 P.3d 712).  As a result, this Court concluded 
that when an agency “interprets the law in the course of fulfilling its governmental 
functions, it is ultimately subject to judicial review without deference by the courts.”  Id. 
¶ 32 n.4. 
 Despite the broad language of Ellis-Hall, its narrower holding does not necessarily 
extend to this case.  Neither Murray, Hughes, nor Ellis-Hall involved an explicit 
delegation by the Legislature granting an agency “substantial discretion to interpret its 
governing statutes and rules,” as this case does.  Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(i).  That 
provision does not just refer to an agency “interpret[ing] the law in the course of fulfilling 
its governmental functions.”  Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 32 n.4.  It deals expressly with 
judicial review of those interpretations.  And Ellis-Hall acknowledges that “deference to 
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agencies is limited to circumstances prescribed by statute or required by our caselaw.”  
Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 26 (emphasis added).  That is what Section 301.5(15)(c)(i) 
plainly requires. 
 To avoid this statutory delegation, this Court would have to conclude that the 
provision was of no effect because “‘questions of law … ha[ve] a single ‘right’ answer,’” 
and therefore “[s]tatutory interpretation does not present such a discretionary decision.”  
Hughes, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 n.4 (first alteration in original) (quoting Murray, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 
33).  But this Court often observes that there can be more than one reasonable 
interpretation of a statute, and thus a possible basis for saying that picking one 
interpretation over another involves a measure of expertise or “discretion.”  See, e.g., LPI 
Servs., 2009 UT 41, ¶ 9 (“‘[W]hen there is more than one permissible reading of the 
statute and no basis in the statutory language or legislative history to prefer one 
interpretation over another ... [t]he agency that has been granted authority to administer 
the statute is the appropriate body to’ interpret it.” (quoting Morton, 814 P.2d at 588-89)); 
State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 34, 309 P.3d 209 (“Having identified two reasonable 
interpretations of the statutory text, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous.”). 
 Declining to extend Ellis-Hall to cases involving express statutory delegations of 
discretion would also conform to one of this Court’s cardinal canons of statutory 
construction—that “‘we must give effect to every provision of a statute and avoid an 
interpretation that will render portions of a statute inoperative.’”  Thayer v. Washington 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2012 UT 31, ¶ 12, 285 P.3d 1142 (quoting Warne v. Warne, 2012 UT 
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13, ¶ 36, 275 P.3d 238).  Finding the Legislature’s express delegation of agency 
discretion ineffective as a matter of law would render Section 301.5(15)(c)(i) a nullity. 
 That leaves only the issue of whether the Legislature may constitutionally dictate a 
standard of review for appeals of agency actions consistent with the separation of powers, 
an issue raised by Ellis-Hall in dicta.  2016 UT 34, ¶¶ 32-33 & n.4.  Although this Court 
need not resolve this issue here for the reasons explained below, there is a distinction 
between the Legislature’s powers in the context of agency review, as opposed to cases 
that invoke the courts’ original constitutional jurisdiction.  Except for proceedings 
involving extraordinary writs, the jurisdiction of the courts to review agency actions is 
entirely a creature of statute.  As this Court has explained, “[i]n the absence of a specific 
statute granting us jurisdiction over a writ of review from an agency proceeding, we have 
no jurisdiction.”  S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
233, 234 (Utah 1992).3  Upholding the Legislature’s ability to control the scope of 
appellate review of agency decisions—a power reserved to it by the Utah Constitution—
would therefore arguably preserve, rather than undermine, the separation of powers. 
                                                 
3 See also DeBry v. Salt Lake Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(“[T]he jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the district court’s appellate jurisdiction 
must be provided by statute…. [UAPA] defines the outermost limits of our appellate 
jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency decisions only when the legislature expressly 
authorizes a right of review.”); Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3 (Supreme Court has “appellate 
jurisdiction … to be exercised as provided by statute”); id. § 5 (district court has 
“appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute”); Utah Code § 78A-3-102 (statutory grant 
of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction); id. § 63G-4-102(8) (“Nothing in this chapter 
may be interpreted to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency 
action.”). 
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 Nonetheless, Holly acknowledges the seemingly broad language in Ellis-Hall that 
statutory interpretation does not involve “discretion,” and that all agency interpretations 
of the law are “ultimately subject to judicial review without deference by the courts.”  
Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶¶ 26, 32 n.4.  If this Court intended that language to sweep more 
broadly than cases involving the mere delegation of authority to administer statutes and 
regulations, and decides to extend Ellis-Hall to cases like this one where the Legislature 
has made an explicit delegation of discretion to an agency to interpret its own statutes 
and regulations, Holly accepts that the standard of review in this case for questions of law 
and for mixed questions that are entirely law-like would be correctness. 
 Ultimately, however, this question should not matter to this Court’s decision on 
the merits.  There are only a handful of issues in this case that can properly be 
characterized as pure questions of law or mixed questions that are entirely law-like.  
Those issues are the following: 
• Whether the Division was required by law to use the AP-42 emission factors to 
estimate particulate matter emissions.  (See Holly’s Resp. Br., Arg. §§ II(A) pp. 
25-27; and II(C)(3) pp. 35-36.)  
• Whether the Division was allowed to use historical emissions inventory data for 
the propane pit flare in its netting analysis.  (Id. § III p. 37.) 
• Whether the Division must include upset emissions in potential-to-emit (PTE) 
calculations for refinery flares or in NAAQS modeling.  (Id. §§ V(A) pp. 42-45; 
and V(B) pp. 48-49.) 
• Whether the Division must include short-term emissions limits in an approval 
order for a minor modification.  (Id. § V(C) pp. 50-51.) 
• Whether the full text of Subpart Ja must be included in an approval order.  (Id. § 
VI pp. 51-53.) 
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 Regardless of whether these issues are reviewed for correctness or abuse of 
discretion, none of them are close calls.  Petitioners have not advanced any reasonable 
contrary interpretation of the laws governing these issues; they have simply disagreed 
with what the laws allow from a policy perspective.  As Holly has already discussed at 
length in its initial Response Brief, this case is not about whether the Utah Legislature is 
doing enough to combat air pollution.  It is simply about whether the Approval Order 
issued by the Division complies with the law.  Because the Approval Order is consistent 
in all respects with the requirements of Utah’s air quality laws, the Executive Director’s 
decision should be affirmed. 
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of October 2016. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
 
 
       /s/ David C. Reymann    
Steven J. Christiansen 
David C. Reymann 
Cheylynn Hayman 
Megan J. Houdeshel 
 
Attorneys for Holly Refining & Marketing 
Company – Woods Cross, LLC 
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